UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S//1995/498
21 June 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

# REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MISSION TO WESTERN SAHARA FROM 3 TO 9 JUNE 1995

## Letter of transmittal

## Letter dated 20 June 1995 from the members of the Security Council mission to Western Sahara addressed to the President of the Security Council

We have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Security Council mission to Western Sahara, which took place from 3 to 9 June 1995. The report is submitted to the Council in accordance with the terms of reference for the mission agreed upon by the Council on 30 May 1995 (S/1995/431) and pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 995 (1995) of 26 May 1995, in which the Council decided to send a mission of the Council to the region with a view to accelerating the implementation of the settlement plan.

(Signed) Legwaila Joseph LEGWAILA (Botswana),
Chairman of the mission

(Signed) Emilio J. CARDENAS (Argentina)

(Signed) Hervé LADSOUS (France)

(Signed) Gerardo MARTINEZ BLANCO (Honduras)

(Signed) Salim Bin MOHAMMED AL-KHUSSAIBY (Oman)

(Signed) Karl F. INDERFURTH (United States of America)

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. In his report to the Security Council of 19 May 1995 on the situation concerning Western Sahara (S/1995/404), the Secretary-General drew attention to the fact that the identification of applicants for participation in the referendum on Western Sahara, as envisaged in the settlement plan, had progressed incrementally, but slowly. He stressed that the identification process could not be brought to a successful conclusion without the full cooperation of the parties. He called on them once again to work with the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in a spirit of genuine cooperation.

2. By its resolution 995 (1995) of 26 May 1995, the Security Council decided, inter alia, to send a mission of the Council to the region, with a view to accelerating the implementation of the settlement plan. At the consultations of the whole held on 30 May 1995, the Council agreed to send a six-member mission to the region, to depart from New York on 3 June 1995.

3. The terms of reference of the mission, as set out by the Security Council (S/1995/431), were as follows:

(a) To impress upon the parties the necessity of cooperating fully with MINURSO in the implementation of all aspects of the settlement plan and to underline the fact that any further delay would put the whole operation at risk;

(b) To assess progress and identify problems in the identification process, bearing in mind the deadline for the referendum of January 1996;

(c) To identify problems in other areas relevant to the fulfilment of the settlement plan (including the reduction of Moroccan troops, the confinement of troops of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (the Frente POLISARIO), the release of political prisoners and detainees, the exchange of prisoners of war and the return of refugees).

4. The Security Council mission was led by Mr. Legwaila Joseph Legwaila (Botswana). Other members of the mission were Mr. Emilio J. Cárdenas (Argentina), Mr. Hervé Ladsous (France), Mr. Gerardo Martínez Blanco (Honduras), Mr. Salim Bin Mohammed Al-Khussaiby (Oman) and Mr. Karl F. Inderfurth (United States of America).

5. The Security Council mission to Western Sahara wishes to express its gratitude to the Governments of Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania and to the leadership of the Frente POLISARIO for their hospitality and support to the mission, including the provision of means of transportation. The mission also wishes to thank Mr. Erik Jensen, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara and the MINURSO staff for their assistance to the mission and their continuous efforts to ensure implementation of the settlement plan.

## II. ACTIVITIES OF THE MISSION

6. Prior to its departure, on 31 May 1995, the mission held successive meetings with the Permanent Representatives of Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania to the United Nations and with the representative of the Frente POLISARIO in New York, in order to elicit their views on the mission's terms of reference. It also asked them to facilitate contacts with the parties and observers with whom the mission would hold meetings and discussions.

7. The mission left New York on 3 June and visited Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania where it held meetings with senior government officials of those countries, including an audience with Mr. Maaoya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, President of Mauritania. In addition, the mission visited Tindouf, where it met with the leadership of the Frente POLISARIO. In Tindouf, the mission also held a briefing session with officials of MINURSO and some of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) observers currently there and witnessed the identification operation in two centres. The mission then went to Laayoune, where it attended a meeting with local Moroccan government officials, was briefed by the MINURSO Force Commander and Civilian Police Commissioner and met with the remaining OAU observers and some MINURSO staff. While in Laayoune, the mission also witnessed the identification operation (see annex I for a full schedule of the mission's activities).

### A. Briefing by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

8. The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Erik Jensen, joined the mission in Rabat and remained with it throughout the period it stayed in the region. During his briefing, Mr. Jensen explained the position of the two parties vis-à-vis the settlement plan and, in particular, the holding of the referendum. After the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 907 (1994) of 29 March 1994, approving option B of the report of the Secretary-General (S/1994/283/Add.1) of 21 March 1994 and calling upon the Identification Commission to proceed with its work on the basis of the Secretary-General's compromise proposal, both parties agreed to move forward with the identification process. Mr. Jensen alerted the mission that the Frente POLISARIO believed that the settlement plan was weighted against it and was concerned about certain developments in the identification process.

9. When asked about the guidelines on which the Identification Commission based its procedures, Mr. Jensen informed the mission of the following: in the event that an applicant was not included in the Spanish census, did not present any documentation confirming his/her identity and substantiating his/her claim for admission under one of the remaining criteria, and if the two sheikhs who were called upon to provide the relevant oral testimony disagreed, the burden of proof would rest with the respective applicant to offer convincing evidence to the Identification Commission that he/she qualified for inclusion in the electoral roll.

10. Mr. Jensen informed the mission that although both parties stressed their commitment to the process and their desire to see it through under the

settlement plan, in practice they had difficulty from time to time in cooperating fully with all aspects of the process thus often causing interruptions in the identification. Even after agreeing to the Deputy Special Representative's formula for solving the problem of the non-timely availability of sheikhs to provide oral testimony, the two parties still had some difficulty in always providing and accepting each other's alternates to replace the absent sheikhs, thus causing further interruptions in the identification operation.

11. The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General further briefed the mission on the status of the work on the implementation of other aspects of the settlement plan. He expressed the hope that after the mission's visit the recurring problems in the identification could be resolved, allowing him time to concentrate on the implementation of the other aspects of the settlement plan.

## B. Meetings with officials of the Government of Morocco

12. In Rabat, the mission first met with Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Abdellatif Filali and officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Filali reiterated Morocco's desire to resolve all problems before the end of the year and hold the referendum in January 1996 as provided for in the settlement plan. Mr. Filali stressed that the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Territory had become essential as D-Day approached.

13. Mr. Filali emphasized that MINURSO needed four essential conditions to be met for the implementation of the settlement plan: (a) permanent support by the Security Council; (b) full cooperation by the two parties; (c) assurances of cooperation and support by the neighbouring countries; and (d) availability of the necessary financial resources. In that context, he observed that while Morocco accepted the criteria for identification, the other party recognized them formally but, he believed, had instructed their sheikhs to accept only three of them in the identification process. This, he stressed, constituted a serious obstacle to the process.

14. When requested by the mission whether Morocco could increase its contribution to the financing of MINURSO, he agreed to consider the request, but he needed specific details through a formal request to Morocco's Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York. Mr. Filali finally stressed that MINURSO's withdrawal prior to the fulfilment of its mandate could be dangerous for the region as it would be a factor of instability.

15. The mission then met with Mr. Driss Basri, Minister of State for the Interior and officials of the Ministry of the Interior. Mr. Basri and his colleagues pointed out that scheduling adjustments to the original timetable, brought about as a result of the cease-fire, impeded progress and resulted in an extra financial burden for the MINURSO operation. Mr. Basri pointed out that, until May 1995, the Government of Morocco had contributed $25 million to cover the accommodation and food of MINURSO staff. In addition, $632,000 covering value added tax had been returned to MINURSO as well as $179,000 covering landing rights.

16. Mr. Basri further reminded the mission of Morocco's view that the 100,000 applicants currently not residing in the Territory would have to be identified. Those applications were not presented in computerized form along with the material relevant to persons living in the territory and therefore were not taken into account in MINURSO's timetable for completing the identification process. With respect to such numbers, Mr. Basri put forward his Government's offer to provide the logistical and technical support for the identification of those applicants either by transferring them to the Territory or by transporting the Identification Commission to them with the aim of identifying 30,000 to 50,000 persons per month. To that effect, he requested the opening of more identification centres.

17. According to Mr. Basri, the Spanish census did not take into account the structure of the Saharan society, hence Morocco's position that additional criteria were needed for the identification of potential voters. He pointed out that, in Morocco's view, criterion 4 was equal in value to others and that applicants under this criterion should not be systematically rejected. He stressed to the mission that all applicants who might not be registered would have a right to appeal.

18. With regard to the reduction of Moroccan troops to 65,000, Mr. Basri reiterated that Morocco had appointed those who would be responsible for dealing with the matter. The mission was informed that Morocco would cooperate with the military component of MINURSO once D-Day had been determined. In the Moroccan Government's view, the confinement of the POLISARIO troops should take place in Algeria. Mr. Basri further confirmed to the mission that the matter of the release of political detainees had been discussed with the independent jurist during his recent visit and that Morocco intended to continue its cooperation with him. He also stressed that once the identification process was completed, Morocco would be ready to accept repatriated refugees, ensuring their honour, security and freedom and providing housing, schooling and whatever else would be necessary for their rehabilitation.

19. At Laayoune, the mission attended a meeting at the Palais de Congrès, where local government officials, several sheikhs and representatives of the Saharans made various presentations. All the speakers pledged their allegiance to His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco. They also pledged their support to MINURSO and underlined their determination to see the process come to a successful end to enable Morocco to put the finishing touches to its territorial integrity. They all stressed that the slowness of the identification process was due to obstacles created by the other party, who wanted to impede the work of the Commission. The speakers also reiterated the promise made by the Minister of the Interior to accelerate the pace of identification in order to reach 30,000 to 50,000 applicants per month.

### C. Meetings with officials of the Frente POLISARIO

20. Upon its arrival at Tindouf on 6 June 1995 and after meeting with MINURSO Identification Commission staff, the mission met with the leadership of the Frente POLISARIO, including Mr. Mohamed Abdelaziz, its Secretary-General, Mr. Bachir Mustapha Sayed, Deputy Secretary-General and coordinator with

MINURSO, and other senior Frente POLISARIO officials. In the Smara refugee camp, the mission met with representatives of the sheikhs.

21. Mr. Abdelaziz reiterated the Frente POLISARIO'S willingness and determination to see a free and fair referendum as a lasting solution to the problem of Western Sahara. He stated that, as a sign of goodwill, the Frente POLISARIO had made many concessions in order to allow for the settlement plan to proceed. It later found out that more concessions were expected in order to make implementation of the plan possible.

22. Mr. Sayed stressed that, in the Frente POLISARIO'S view, the list of voters should be based on the 1974 census, with a small margin of increase to allow for population growth. He informed the mission that the Frente POLISARIO had expressed serious reservations about the implementation of criteria 4 and 5 and about the admission of oral testimony by the sheikhs and had asked for guarantees that their concerns would be addressed by the United Nations. However, the Frente POLISARIO felt very concerned about the manner in which the identification operation was being conducted and about MINURSO's ability to ensure fairness in the process. According to Mr. Sayed, so far in the identification, the two sheikhs appeared to disagree in 60 per cent of the cases; there had not been one single agreement among the party teams observing the process in the identification centres.

23. He stressed that the Frente POLISARIO had accepted the cease-fire in order to achieve self-determination through peaceful means. In its view, alterations made later to the settlement plan had led to one party controlling the process. He reiterated that the Frente POLISARIO expected fair implementation of the settlement plan as agreed upon by both parties and as adopted by the Security Council.

24. Mr. Sayed spoke about the difficulty the POLISARIO sheikhs had in being called to testify in the identification of persons, only 20 per cent of whom had been included in the Spanish census and 80 per cent of whom were said to be without adequate documentation. It would not be easy for the POLISARIO to convince the sheikhs to continue participating in a process characterized by lack of transparency.

25. The difficulty the sheikhs had with the process was later reiterated to the mission by the sheikhs themselves when they addressed the mission at a meeting that took place at the Smara refugee camp. All the speakers rejected the present occupation of the Territory by Morocco and attributed delays in the identification process to obstacles created by the other party. Some of the sheikhs pointed out that in 75 per cent of the cases they had disagreed over an applicant's identification; also that some of their colleagues on the Moroccan side had expressed fear about testifying freely. The sheikhs proposed that, in order to expedite and make the identification process more credible, the sub-fraction leaders should decide in advance about the persons who belonged in their sub-fraction and then provide the list to the Identification Commission.

26. With regard to the confinement of its troops, the Frente POLISARIO reiterated that they should be confined in the area between the sand-wall (berm) and the international border. When it came to the withdrawal of Moroccan

troops, the Frente POLISARIO expressed doubts about MINURSO's ability to monitor the Moroccan withdrawal and to neutralize the Moroccan paramilitary forces as called for in the settlement plan.

27. For the Frente POLISARIO, the question of the repatriation of refugees was more than a humanitarian problem; it was also a political issue as the United Nations would have to convince the refugees that it would be safe to return to their land. On the same subject, POLISARIO expressed disappointment that neither the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) nor the Security Council had intervened at the time that Morocco transferred thousands of people to the Territory, in violation of the settlement plan.

28. The Frente POLISARIO did not wish MINURSO's withdrawal prior to the completion of its mandate. It strongly supported the holding of a fair and transparent referendum, asking for guarantees to that effect from the Security Council. At the same time, the mission observed the POLISARIO leadership's increasing doubts about MINURSO's ability to ensure fairness in the process, doubts that some observers believe could place the settlement plan at risk. The mission argued, in the strongest terms possible, that the interests of the POLISARIO were best protected by staying with the plan, that the plan was the only possible solution and that there was no credible alternative to it.

### D. Discussions with officials of the Government of Algeria

29. In the afternoon of 5 June 1995, the mission travelled to Algiers, where it met with Mr. Mohammed Salah Dembri, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, and other officials of the Foreign Ministry. Mr. Dembri argued for a political solution without victors or vanquished. He said that, in Algeria's view, Western Sahara was a typical case of decolonization. Inclusion of additional criteria had diverted the settlement plan from its original objective, leading to quantitative mechanisms that could not be mastered. Moreover, further attempts had been made to erode and weaken the settlement plan.

30. On the matter of the confinement of the POLISARIO troops, the Government of Algeria strongly rejected the proposal made in 1991 by the then Special Representative of the Secretary-General that they be confined in Algeria. In the Government's view, this would extend the theatre of conflict to Algerian territory. Algeria expressed the view that the cantonment of POLISARIO troops should be part of a consultation process, as defined by the initial United Nations and OAU resolutions, outside any military and administrative constraints. Algerian government officials further pointed out that the settlement plan stipulated placing the Moroccan forces along the berm, which is not part of the international border. In Algeria's view, the troops of both parties should be confined in an equitable manner within the Territory. Similarly, the return of refugees and the exchange of prisoners of war should be addressed by the parties in a bilateral manner.

31. Mr. Dembri stressed that for any solid progress to be made, there should be consultation between the two parties as the United Nations cannot replace them. He reiterated Algeria's commitment to peace, security and stability in the

region and its intention to continue helping the two parties to reach compromise through dialogue on other aspects and emphasized that the two parties must have a vision of the post-referendum period.

## E. Meetings with officials of the Government of Mauritania

32. On 7 June 1995, the mission visited Mauritania, where it met with Mr. Maaoya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, President, and Mr. Mohamed Ould Boubakar, Prime Minister, in the presence of Mr. Mohamed Salem Ould Lekhal, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and other Foreign Ministry officials. The President of Mauritania informed the mission that the settlement of the Western Sahara issue was of great importance to Mauritania, owing in part to the long border it shared with the Territory.

33. Authorities in Nouakchott follow developments of this issue very closely, which is of the utmost importance to the security of the subregion. Mauritania has already had difficulties in the past because of the existence of the conflict in Western Sahara. In Mauritania's view, the United Nations should persevere and be more forceful in trying to achieve a solution. A premature withdrawal of MINURSO would be catastrophic for the subregion. Mauritania offered to put its limited resources at the disposal of the United Nations in an effort to find a peaceful solution. The President agreed to enable MINURSO to proceed as soon as possible with the identification of applicants living in Mauritania.

## F. Meeting with observers of the Organization of African Unity

34. In both Tindouf and Laayoune, the mission met with the OAU observers assisting the Identification Commission in its work. Some of the OAU observers saw many problems in the manner in which the identification operation was being conducted, causing MINURSO to have almost lost control of it. In their view, the Council should entrust MINURSO to take over the identification operation completely. Others acknowledged that the problems were not insurmountable and that MINURSO had come a long way in the search for peace.

35. The OAU observers cautioned that it would not be easy to proceed with the other aspects of the settlement plan and that there were no guarantees that innovative ways to resolve them would succeed. Although a January deadline for the referendum might not be realistic, it would be unthinkable to talk about MINURSO's withdrawal at the present stage. The observers also cautioned that the African continent would find it difficult to understand the reasons behind MINURSO's withdrawal.

36. All OAU observers urged the Security Council to be more forceful on the question of cooperation by the parties and to elicit their consent to abide with their agreement with MINURSO; the Council should also entrust MINURSO to take over the identification operation completely.

### G. Briefing by the Force Commander and the Civilian Police Commissioner

37. In Laayoune, the mission was briefed by the MINURSO Force Commander, Brigadier-General Andre Van Baelen, and the Civilian Police Commissioner, Colonel Wolf-Dieter Krampe. The Force Commander highlighted the difficulties faced by MINURSO's military component in its operational capabilities as a result of administrative problems and financial limitations placed on the mission. Those problems and limitations had caused critical logistical deficiencies. He stressed that, to a large extent, the success of the cease-fire had been due to MINURSO's ability to monitor it regularly. He expressed concern that if MINURSO's military presence in the field were to be reduced because of the above-mentioned constraints, the two parties might lose their confidence in it.

38. The Civilian Police Commissioner explained to the mission the role of the civilian police in the identification operation. He also highlighted some of the tasks that the civilian police would be expected to undertake once MINURSO went into full expansion.

## III. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

39. In its discussions with the two parties the mission observed that there was continuing suspicion and lack of trust. As a result, in the course of identification, technical problems that could have been resolved easily had there been goodwill, had become politicized and blown out of proportion, with each party blaming the other for the lack of progress. This could make it nearly impossible for MINURSO to meet its objectives unless both parties improved their performance. The parties' cooperation must be combined with the necessary resources being made available to MINURSO, if there is to be any realistic hope of maintaining the timetable.

40. Given the complexity of the tasks to be performed, the continuing delays caused by the two parties and the constraints imposed by limited resources and local conditions, the mission is concerned that the time necessary to perform the functions associated with the identification process and other aspects of the settlement plan has been underestimated. The mission therefore feels that there is a real risk that the identification process may be extended beyond the time previously envisaged and the referendum may not be held in January 1996.

41. In the course of the mission's discussions with the two parties, while trying to elicit their commitment to abandon their insistence on reciprocity in the number and operation of identification centres on each side, each party insisted that its performance be conditional on the performance of the other. The mission strongly recommends that both parties abandon their insistence on reciprocity in the number and operation of identification centres on each side and refrain from their habit of blaming their lack of cooperation on the other side.

42. With regard to mobile identification teams, it was explained to the mission that it was hardly realistic to move around the desert the generators, computers

and other equipment necessary for the identification, in addition to the teams of party and OAU observers, rotating sheikhs and MINURSO personnel. While moving through the desert, all these people would have to be supplied with food, water and accommodation. The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General therefore suggested, and the mission agreed with him, that additional identification teams be mobilized instead, in temporary fixed centres.

43. There should be no limit to the number of persons to be identified on any given day. Moreover, other practices aimed at ensuring a faster pace of the identification process should be strongly encouraged. The mission urges that the highest possible number of identifications per day, as many as a full working day allows, be permitted to take place.

44. A key element of the identification process is the work of the legal review office. The substantive review of the undecided cases has recently commenced. Unless this is expedited, the time needed to review those cases will further delay the date of the referendum. The mission recommends that MINURSO speed up the substantive review of the identification case files and the compiling of preliminary voter eligibility lists.

45. In that respect, the mission further recommends measures that will ensure full confidentiality in dealing with the review cases. MINURSO should maximize security arrangements with respect to information about the identification.

46. The mission calls upon the Government of Morocco to conduct preliminary vetting of the 100,000 applicants currently not residing in the Territory prior to examination by the Identification Commission, in order to enable MINURSO to maintain its timetable for completing the identification process.

47. MINURSO should without delay commence the identification operation for applicants living in Mauritania, in cooperation with the Government of Mauritania, with a view to completing that operation as soon as possible.

48. Reports on the progress of identification should be made to the Security Council every two weeks. Should the identification operation be interrupted or slowed down for any reason, this should be reported immediately to the Council.

49. The mission calls upon the two parties not to inhibit access to the identification centres and to take all necessary steps in order to facilitate a free and fair process on the basis of the guidelines outlined by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in paragraph 9 above.

50. The mission recommends speeding up the administrative decision-making process to enable MINURSO to have all the human and other resources that could be required to expedite its work.

51. It is important that communiqués issued by MINURSO be transmitted over the radio by both parties, as requested by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

52. Given the prevailing conditions following the cease-fire, the original timetable for the identification was delinked from D-Day. The Deputy Special

Representative of the Secretary-General, in consultation with the two parties and the observer countries, should seek ways to secure a date in the near future for the reduction and confinement of troops in order to allow the Secretary-General to make his ruling in the matter in early September. The mission recommends that the Deputy Special Representative should also consult with the two parties on the exchange of prisoners of war and the release of political detainees, so that those issues could be removed from the timetable and linked closely to the commencement of the transitional period.

53. Finally, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General should give immediate attention to problems associated with the registration of refugees called for in the settlement plan, including the time required for this process and the resources made available to date. UNHCR should take steps to ensure that commencement of voluntary repatriation of refugees not be delayed.

54. The mission calls attention to the fact that one of MINURSO's main successes has been the establishment and maintenance of the cease-fire. It was very clearly communicated to the mission that in the event of MINURSO's withdrawal before completing its mandate, the risk of a return to some form of hostilities would increase.

55. In its continuing consideration of this issue, the Security Council needs to keep in mind the stake it has in ensuring the credibility of the process.

56. Finally, the mission acknowledges that some progress has been made in the identification process in recent weeks and underscores that, while fairness must be guaranteed, such progress will have to be sustained and improved significantly to allow the referendum to take place early next year.

Annex I

SECURITY COUNCIL MISSION TO WESTERN SAHARA: SCHEDULE OF ACTIVITIES

Saturday, 3 June 1995

Departure from New York

Sunday, 4 June 1995 - Arrival in Casablanca/Rabat - Morocco

Afternoon — Briefing of the mission by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Evening — Dinner (reception) hosted by the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Morocco

Monday, 5 June 1995

10 a.m. — Meeting with the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Morocco

11.30 a.m. — Meeting with the Minister of State for the Interior of Morocco

Algeria

5.30 p.m. — Meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria

9 p.m. — Dinner hosted by the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Algeria at Residence El Mithak

Tuesday, 6 June 1995

Morning — Working session with senior officials of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Algeria

Courtesy call on and brief meeting with the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Noon — Departure for Tindouf

Tuesday, 6 June 1995 - POLISARIO: Tindouf

2.30 p.m. — First round of meetings with the Frente POLISARIO

7.30 p.m. — Meeting with local sheikhs (Chioufs)

10.30 p.m. — Meeting with OAU observers in Tindouf

12.30 a.m. — Second round of meetings (working dinner) with the Frente POLISARIO

Wednesday, 7 June 1995

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| Morning | Third round of meetings with the Frente POLISARIO |
| Noon | Visit to Smara and Ayoune identification centres |
| 1 p.m. | Meeting with President Mohamed Abdel Aziz of the Frente POLISARIO |
| | Luncheon hosted by President Mohamed Abdel Aziz |
| | Departure for Laayoune |

Laayoune

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| 4.30 p.m. | Meeting with Moroccan officials and Sahraouis at the Palais de Congrès |

MINURSO; Laayoune

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| 5.45 p.m. | Briefings by the Force Commander |
| | Briefings by the Police Commissioner |
| 6.15 p.m. | Meeting with the OAU observer delegation at Laayoune |
| 6.45 p.m. | Individual interviews of MINURSO personnel by some members of the mission |
| 8.30 p.m. | Dinner hosted by the Wali (Mayor) of Laayoune |

Thursday, 8 June 1995

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| 9.30 p.m. | Visit to the identification centre at Laayoune and inspection of MINURSO identification facilities, as well as observation of the identification process |
| | Individual interviews of MINURSO personnel by some members of the mission |
| 10.30 a.m. | Departure for Nouakchott |

Mauritania

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| 2 p.m. | Meeting with the President of Mauritania |
| | Brief meeting with the Prime Minister |
| 2.45 p.m. | Luncheon hosted by the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation |

3.30 p.m. Individual meetings between members of the mission and representatives of their Governments in Mauritania

Departure for Casablanca

Morocco

8 p.m. Arrival in Casablanca

Visit to the Hassan II mosque

10 p.m. Meeting of the mission to discuss its report to the Security Council

Friday, 9 June 1995

9.15 a.m. Press conference by the Chairman of the mission at Casablanca airport

9.30 a.m. Departure for New York

Annex II

LIST OF OFFICIAL CONTACTS

1. Government of Morocco

Mr. Abdellatif Filali, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

Mr. Driss Basri, Minister of State for the Interior

Mr. Ahmed Snoussi, Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations

Mr. Brahim Hakim, Ambassador

Mr. Hafid Benhachem, Governor

Mr. Mohamed Azmi, Governor

Mr. Othman Bonabid, Governor

Mr. Aziz Hasbi, Adviser

Mr. Chanki Serghimi, Adviser

Mr. Hamid Charbar, Interior Ministry official

Mr. Hassan Duchen, (Wali) Mayor of Laayoune

Mr. Brika Zeroccali, parliamentary representative for Laayoune

Mr. Ali Ould Said, representative of the Sahraouis

Mrs. Leila Maa El-Ainine, representative of Saharan women

Mr. Abdelouahab Bellouki, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Morocco to the United Nations

2. Government of Algeria

Mr. Mohammed Salah Dembri, Minister for Foreign Affairs

Mr. Mohamed Amine Kherbe, Director-General for Multilateral Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Mimouni Sofiane, Director for Multilateral Relations

Mr. Sabri Benhadoum, Director for International Policy

Mr. Abdelaziz Sbaa, Head of the Communications Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Sabrie Benkadoun

Mr. Sofiane Mioune

Mr. Mamedine Ayani, Deputy Director for United Nations Political Affairs and Disarmament, General Directorate for Multilateral Affairs

Ambassador Abdel Kadir Taffar, Secretary-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

3. Frente POLISARIO

Mr. Mohamed Abdelaziz, Secretary-General

Mr. Bachir Mustapha Sayed, Deputy Secretary-General and coordinator with MINURSO

Mr. Ahmed Boukhari, Representative at the United Nations

Mr. Mohamed El Omali, observer with the MINURSO Identification Commission

Ms. Sena Ahmed, Secretary-General of the National Union of Sahraoui Women

Mr. Radi Bachir Sgaiar, Representative for the Nordic Countries

Mr. Mohamed Fadel Ismail, Political Adviser to the Saharan National Commission for the Referendum

Mr. Naddadi Cheij Ahmed Leheiba, observer with the Identification Commission

Mr. Yahir Banhaubaime, Official Coordinator with the Identification Commission

Mr. Faddi Mohamed Ahmed, Military Liaison Officer

4. Meetings with the Government of Mauritania

Mr. Maaoya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, President

Mr. Mohamed Ould Boubakar, Prime Minister

Mr. Mohamed Salem Ould Lekhal, Minister for Foreign Affairs (in attendance)

Mr. Khatry Ould Jidou, Secretary-General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation

Mr. Abdersahmane Ould Hamza, Director of International Organizations

Mr. Drahite Mamedou, Director, Legal and Consular Affairs

5. Meetings with Observers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

Mr. Doudou Diop

Mr. Marcel Diouf

Mr. Solomon Gomes

Mr. Jean Raymond Loumabeka

Mr. Tshimanga M. Motoke

Mr. Ibrahim Saley

Mr. Alpha Ibrahim Sow

6. Meetings with MINURSO staff

Mr. Erik Jensen, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Brigadier-General Andre Van Baelen, MINURSO Force Commander

Colonel Wolf-Dieter Krampe, MINURSO Police Commissioner

Mr. Ali Ouni, Chief Administrative Officer

Mr. Raouf Abdel-Kader, Registration Officer

Mr. Martin Bentz, Administrative Liaison Officer

Mr. Robert Chen, Finance Officer

Mr. Jean-Jacques Edeline, Executive Assistant, Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Mr. Eric Korchan, Movement Control Office

Mr. Sizostris Makar, member of the Identification Commission

Ms. Katlyn Thomas, member of the Identification Commission

Ms. Beatriz Bosque, member of the Identification Commission

Ms. Domitila Icha, registration clerk

Mr. Bachir Al-Okla, member of the Identification Commission

Mr. Arnaud Blasco, computer specialist

Mrs. Chantal Buffet, secretary

Mr. Jeffrey Smith, technician

Mrs. Jacqueline Chenard, registration officer

Mrs. Liliane Delbarre, secretary

Mrs. Paulette Forest, secretary

Mr. Youssef Gemayel, member of the Identification Commission

Mrs. Sophie Jacquin, MINURSO Spokesperson

Mrs. Juliette Jayet, secretary

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